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abstract: This article examines the fi rst two decades of the transregional Asia–
Europe Meeting (ASEM) from its inception with the Bangkok Summit 
of 1996. Examining instances of region building and the socialisation 
of states, it identifi es the gradual emergence of a role for the forum, 
one that stands in some contrast to initial participant expectations. 
In this respect, rather than a structure for delivering substantive 
negotiated outcomes around issues such as trade liberalisation, 
the value of ASEM across its fi rst 20 years came increasingly to be 
seen in its ideational aspects: identity building, norm diffusion, and 
dialogue without preconceptions.
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1. introduction
The Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an iteration of the broader phenomenon 
of interregionalism that has gained greater currency in international relations 
over the last fi ve decades, given additional impetus in the post-bipolar period by 
the emergence of new regionalisms and their prioritisation of engagement with 
counterpart groupings. Traceable to the fi rst Yaoundé Convention, concluded 
between the European Union (EU) and the Associated African States and 
Madagascar in 1963, group-to-group interregional structures were at the outset 
an innovation of EU external relations, which have, in succeeding years, gained 
broader recognition as a mechanism of engagement, and have consequently 
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become a seemingly indelible feature of the international system. That the place 
of such structures in international relations and global governance has been 
firmly established is evident in their recognition by, among others, the WTO 
Secretariat (Crawford & Fiorentino, 2005) and the World Bank (2005).
Simply stated, interregionalism constitutes formalised engagement between 
groupings of states from different regions, each coordinating to a greater or 
lesser degree (Hänggi, 2006, pp. 39–40). This group-to-group organising 
principle is central to the definition of interregionalism which is, therefore, 
in essence a binary structure, even if at times only notionally (Doidge, 2011, 
pp. 2–3).1 Under this umbrella, two forms are identifiable. The first—bilateral 
interregionalism (Rüland, 1999, pp. 2–3)—constitutes relations between 
regional organisations (e.g., EU–MERCOSUR, ASEAN–Andean Community). 
The second—transregionalism—involves dialogues in which at least one of the 
partner groupings is not a regional integration arrangement, but rather a more-or-
less coordinated grouping of states (e.g., EU–LAC, FEALAC). ASEM falls into 
this latter grouping. Importantly, transregionalism is a more recent phenomenon 
than bilateral interregionalism, and indeed the first iteration of this variant was the 
Asia–Europe Meeting itself. As a consequence, ASEM became both the template 
according to which other similar structures were modelled, as was most notably 
the case with the Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC) 
(Doidge, 2011, pp. 164–165), while also being forced to break new ground in 
terms of establishing a role for itself. It is in this context that this article will 
consider the Asia–Europe Meeting, examining early expectations as to its role 
and its consequent evolution over the two decades from its inception in 1996. 
In so doing it will highlight the way in which certain expectations concerning 
the forum have transitioned from an emphasis on ASEM as an instrument of 
substantive Asia–Europe cooperation, to one in which community-building and 
engagement have come to the fore.
1 APEC thus does not constitute an interregional forum. While it engages states from 
multiple regions, it lacks the regional mechanisms of coordination to be expected of 
interregionalism. As Hänggi (2006, p. 40) notes, APEC was conceived as a regional 
endeavour, and as a consequence is best characterised as a form of ‘megaregional-
ism’.
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2. aSEM: origins and expectations
ASEM’s origins are to be found in a series of meetings convened in the 
Singaporean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office 
during August 1994 to explore mechanisms for improving the Asia–Europe 
relationship (Pou Serradell, 1996, p. 186). These discussions are generally held 
to have been the product of Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong reading too much 
into the Commission’s 1994 New Asia Strategy (Forster, 1999, p. 752): while the 
document highlighted a need to push for increased European economic presence 
in Asia, and to deepen the relationship as a means to extend its role as a global 
actor (Communication from the Commission, COM(1994)314 final), the reality 
was that these elements constituted something of a rhetorical flourish rather 
than the clear, focused statement of intent that Goh perceived. Nevertheless, 
despite initial European reticence or, in the case of German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl, open hostility (Camroux & Lechervy, 1996, p. 443) toward the concept, 
the Singaporean proposal was eventually accepted by the Council of Ministers 
meeting under the French Presidency in 1995. Reservations on a new Asia–
Europe forum were not solely the domain of the Europeans, however, with 
ASEAN being forced to exercise considerable diplomacy in recruiting the 
Northeast Asian states to the cause: Japan in particular was concerned that the 
new structure would negatively impact its close relationship with the United 
States, while China feared that it would serve simply as a means to single it out 
for criticism (Camroux & Lechervy, 1996, pp. 443–444). In spite of this initial 
scepticism, however, ASEM was quickly added to the roster of international 
fora, being launched in March 1996 with the convening of the first Summit in 
Bangkok.
As the first forum of its type, there was no clear model on which to base the 
functioning of ASEM cooperation. In the absence of prior experience from 
which to draw, two elements in particular served to structure expectations: (i) 
the influence of the forum for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC); 
and (ii) the core economic concerns evident among the founding members. 
APEC influence derived from the context in which ASEM emerged, with the 
new forum conceived as filling a “missing link” in interregional relations. This 
view stemmed from the apparent triadisation of the global economy in which 
economic de-territorialisation and integration within and between the regions 
of Europe, North America and Asia were deepening at a pace greater than the 
broader global trend (Ruigrok & van Tulder, 1995, p. 151). Such economic 
processes had been accompanied by the building of corresponding interregional 
dialogue structures between these three core regions in the form of trans-Atlantic 
Bereitgestellt von  University of Canterbury | Heruntergeladen  10.11.19 21:25   UTC
9
ASEM’s First Two Decades: A Role Discovered
Baltic Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 2 (27)
relations and the APEC framework, with the notable exception of a formal tie 
between Europe and Asia. Goh Chok Tong’s proposal was designed to plug this 
gap, with the call for “Pacific-style” ties between the two positing the new forum 
as something of a mirror to APEC. With this link drawn, the Asia-Pacific forum 
inevitably served to structure certain expectations as to the role and functioning 
of the new Asia–Europe dialogue. While APEC had been operative since 1989, 
it convened its first Summit in 1993, at which time agreement around a set of 
reciprocal trade concessions was reached. When this was followed in 1994 by 
the tabling of plans for a Pacific Free Trade Area, the forum was seen as having 
taken a significant step forward, leaving behind its reputation as a talking shop 
in favour of the pursuit of substantive results. Conceived in this context, it was 
expected that ASEM would move rapidly towards the achievement of concrete 
outcomes, particularly in the area of trade liberalisation.
Alongside the influence of APEC, expectations for ASEM were also structured 
around the economic concerns of the founding members, most notably fears of 
marginalisation. In the early 1990s, the EU had undertaken a reappraisal of its 
ties with Asia, motivated largely by concern that its competitors—the US and 
Japan—were stealing a march in the region, and the need to gain a share of the 
high rates of growth occurring in the Asian economies. The resulting New Asia 
Strategy (Communication from the Commission COM(1994)314 final) made it 
clear that the primary factor underpinning the EU interest in an expansion of ties 
was unashamedly economic, with a focus on establishing mechanisms to mitigate 
potential economic marginalisation. Similar concerns were evident among the 
Asian states, and particularly the members of ASEAN, with perennial fears over 
the establishment of a “fortress Europe” enhanced as the common market neared 
completion (Yeung et al., 1999, p. 99). Such concerns were supplemented in 
the bipolar period by worries over potential trade diversion as a consequence of 
Europe’s turn towards its eastern neighbourhood: EU exports to the Central and 
Eastern European countries had increased by 135% between 1990 and 1995, and 
imports from the region by 93% (EUROSTAT, 2001). A link with Europe mirroring 
the economic and commercially focused tie with the United States embodied in 
APEC was therefore seen as essential (Pou Serradell, 1996, pp. 186–188).
Expectations of the Asia–Europe Meeting as an arena for high-end cooperation 
were, then, elevated from the outset, a situation made clear through the European 
Council’s assertion that the new forum must pursue “concrete and substantial 
results” (European Council, 1995, p. 43). Notwithstanding the political element 
to the process, these substantive outcomes were conceived primarily in terms of 
trade and financial matters, and indeed it was around such issues that the early 
years of ASEM engagement were structured. Thus, following the first ASEM, 
Bereitgestellt von  University of Canterbury | Heruntergeladen  10.11.19 21:25   UTC
10
Mathew Doidge
Baltic Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 2 (27)
separate sub-Summit fora were established for Economic and Finance Ministers, 
Senior Officials on Trade and Investment, and Customs Directors-General and 
Commissioners, alongside which was the creation of an Asia–Europe Business 
Forum. Further, the first steps were taken towards implementation of a Trade 
Facilitation Action Plan and an Investment Promotion Action Plan, raising the 
prospect that institutionalised rules and procedures would emerge to guide the 
facilitation and liberalisation of Asia–Europe trade and investment relations 
(Yeo, 2003, p. 155).
Despite the proliferation of such structures, however, the anticipated outcomes 
in terms of economic cooperation and trade liberalisation failed to eventuate, 
notwithstanding ongoing rhetorical commitment to these goals. Indeed, 
institutional proliferation in the absence of substantive engagement quickly 
became a characteristic of Asia–Europe cooperation, reflecting a form of 
“cooperation malaise” (Doidge, 2013, p. 151). The result was an increase in the 
breadth of the process, while depth of engagement remained notably limited: 
a case in many ways of much “sound and fury, signifying nothing”. This 
failure is largely the product of two factors. First was an evident capability–
expectations gap, with anticipated outcomes requiring a level of cooperation 
between the partner regions that proved difficult to achieve (Doidge, 2011, 
pp. 172–174). Second, exacerbating this, was the informal nature of the ASEM 
framework itself, influencing its ability to pursue concrete goals. The lack of an 
administrative secretariat, for example, meant that sub-Summit fora were often 
possessed of a certain amnesia regarding prior meetings, and as a consequence 
routinely ploughed the same ground with an attendant impact on the pace of 
cooperation (Commission official, cited in Doidge, 2011, p. 119). Similarly, the 
preference for soft law instruments and the non-binding and consensual nature 
of decision-taking limited cooperation, meaning that agreements may be taken 
only as indicative rather than substantive.
3. a reconsideration of aSEM: role found?
While calls for substantive engagement within ASEM continue, in practice it is 
broadly recognised that this goal is, at least currently, beyond the capacity of the 
forum to achieve. Instead, what became increasingly evident over the forum’s 
first two decades was a reframing of its value in the eyes of participants as a 
political space, an ideational and discursive process, acting as a framework for 
dialogue and an arena for socialisation and norm diffusion, and consequently 
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functioning both as a filter for global fora and as a mechanism for securitisation 
(Doidge, 2011, pp. 142–143). Intrinsic to this assignation of value has been the 
gradual accretion of experience in engagement, and the progressive layering of 
norms and practices of interaction, contributing to the establishment of shared 
identities and interests, the creation of a “we” feeling that underpins international 
relations and security. In this respect, ASEM may be seen in constructivist 
terms as a process of embedding “shared understandings, expectations, and 
social knowledge” (Wendt, 1994, p. 389), replacing threat perceptions with an 
element of mutual trust, and establishing a firmer foundation for Asia–Europe 
relations and thereby contributing to political and economic stability. In part, 
this altered view of ASEM has been premised upon a recognition of areas of 
apparent success, with two particular examples foremost among them: (i) the 
fostering of regional cooperation in Asia; and (ii) the process of socialisation of 
participant states into the international system.
4. aSEM and asian region-building
In terms of fostering regional cooperation, ASEM has played a successful role 
in drawing together the member states of ASEAN with their Northeast Asian 
counterparts—China, Japan and South Korea. Where earlier visions of pan-Asian 
cooperation had been unsuccessful—including most notably the 1990 proposal 
from Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad for the establishment of an 
East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), a concept that proved unable to overcome 
opposition from the US and Japan who were concerned, among other things, 
with the potential consequences for APEC (Terada, 2003, p. 258)—the Asia–
Europe Meeting is seen to have been instrumental in progressing intra-Asian 
cooperation. Much of this is attributable to the binary structure of ASEM which 
explicitly posits an Asian group alongside a European counterpart and reinforces 
this through the establishment of mechanisms of intraregional cooperation. At a 
very basic level, the first ASEM Summit in 1996 saw a relatively loose Asia—
comprising the then seven ASEAN members and three Northeast Asian states—
confronted by a much more tightly coordinated “other” in the form of the 
European Union.2 This underlying asymmetry necessitated closer cooperation 
and coordination from the Asian states in order to be effective in the various 
ASEM fora, providing the motive force for subsequent efforts in this direction.
2 Characterised in terms of economic dialogue by the extent of its supranational actor-
ness, and in political dialogue by the explicit attempt to coordinate to a higher level 
in ASEM than was usually the case (Doidge, 2011, p. 129).
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In practice, intra-Asian coordination preceded the first Summit in Bangkok, a 
response to the need to establish positions on a number of sometimes contentious 
issues, including the structure and agenda of the meeting. Given its position as 
convenor of ASEM 1, Thailand acted in the role of coordinator, facilitating a 
level of consensus which resulted in a joint Asian discussion paper on the future 
of the new forum. With the increasing demands for cooperative engagement 
resulting from the proliferation of structures in the wake of the inaugural 
Summit, this initial experience was seen as having been sufficiently positive 
to cement in place the coordinating role. In order to foster both intraregional 
cooperation and to provide guidance to the interregional process, a system of 
Joint Coordinators was therefore established, with the EU represented by the 
Presidency and the Commission, while the Asian states drew one Coordinator 
each from the ASEAN and Northeast Asian membership on a rotating basis. 
The system of Coordinators and the ongoing need for engagement in preparation 
for meetings of the various ASEM fora subsequently provided a foundation for 
greater intra-Asian cooperation. With the US resiling from its earlier negative 
view of the EAEC concept,3 and the 1997 Asian financial crisis highlighting a 
need for East Asian solutions to regional problems in the face of a perceived 
lack of commitment by Western powers, the tentative process that had begun 
with ASEM was given something of a boost. As a result, December 1997 saw 
the convening of the first ASEAN+3 meeting in the margins of an informal 
ASEAN Summit, with agreement reached for a semi-formalisation of the 
grouping through the preparation of indicative agendas and the tasking of 
senior officials to explore follow-up activities and review the implementation 
of agreed initiatives. Subsequently, an East Asia Vision Group was established 
to plot a future path for ASEAN+3 cooperation, and an East Asia Study Group 
to review its recommendations including towards the establishment of an East 
Asia Summit (launched in 2005) and an East Asia Free Trade Area. In 2005, the 
forum was formalised with the signing of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which 
established joint goals and charted the future aim of establishing an East Asian 
Community. As it now stands, ASEAN+3 is an institutionalised and expansive 
process, comprising around 60 fora spanning a range of sectoral issues and 
involving engagement from the technical through to the Summit level. As such, 
it is seen as a significant outcome of the ASEM process (Hänggi, 2003).
3 Secretary of State for Business and Agricultural Affairs Joan E. Spero made clear at 
the 29th ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in Jakarta in 1996 that the US would 
no longer oppose the establishment of an EAEC-like structure, so long as this did not 
split the Pacific Rim (Stubbs, 2002, pp. 442–443).
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5. aSEM and the socialisation of states
In a related vein, the Asia–Europe Meeting is seen to have played a key role in 
the broader institutionalisation of international relations, most notably through 
facilitating socialisation into, and adherence to, the web of rules, norms and 
values that underpin global relations. Indeed, such has been defined as the greatest 
success of the forum (Commission official, cited in Doidge, 2011, p. 135). In the 
immediate post-bipolar period, there was some concern about instability in the 
international system: the lack of an overarching security concern drawing states 
together, combined with the new pre-eminence of economics in international 
relations, raised fears as to the inevitabilitly of a trade war among the core 
economic powers (Hänggi, 1999, pp. 58–59). As a consequence, systemic 
stability became something of a central concern, with a perceived need to further 
institutionalise international relations and to ensure that all states played by 
the same rules. ASEM constituted just such an institution, concerned with the 
implementation of global norms and standards (Forster, 1999, p. 744) or, less 
positively in the view of Cammack (1999, p. 14), with “imposing—developing 
and reinforcing—the hegemony capital”. The Asia–Europe Meeting may 
therefore be seen as a mechanism for embedding both (neo)liberal economic 
rules and norms of political cooperation and engagement at the global level 
through the socialisation of its participant states. In this respect, the role of the 
forum in relation to China, and to a lesser extent Vietnam, is often highlighted 
(though it is with the former that the following discussion will be concerned).
China’s rise as an economic, political and military power from the 1990s raised 
certain questions as to its external policies, generating considerable uncertainty 
around its political and military intentions in its immediate neighbourhood, as 
well as to whether it would be “an integrated member of the global economic 
community, or a pariah, an outsider, potentially a rogue” (CAEC, 1997, p. 61). 
A China not effectively integrated into the global system was seen as having the 
potential to become progressively more difficult to engage with (Maitland & 
Hu, 1998, p. 20). This need had been recognised by the European Union prior 
to the advent of ASEM, with an expressed intent to “integrate into the open, 
market-based world trading system those Asian countries such as China, India 
or Vietnam which are moving from state controls to market-oriented economies” 
(Communication from the Commission, COM(1994)314 final, p. 13). Indeed, it 
was with issues of non-compliance with multilateral trade rules that the majority 
of the EU’s trade disputes with China were concerned (Dent, 1999, p. 144). As 
such, the integration of China into the WTO-led trade regime was identified as 
a priority.
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China was a member of the Asia–Europe Meeting from the outset, but until 2001 
it was not a member of the WTO, despite having applied to join the multilateral 
trading structure as early as 1986.4 This lacuna between accession to ASEM 
and to the WTO therefore saw the former play an important part in drawing 
China further into the multilateral system. Multilateral norms underpinned the 
ASEM structure from the outset, with the first Summit formally adopting a 
“common commitment to market economy, open multilateral trading system, 
non-discriminatory liberalisation and open regionalism” (ASEM, 1996, §10) 
and to “complement and reinforce efforts to strengthen the […] trading system 
embodied in the WTO” (ASEM, 1996, §11). Subsequently, as the ASEM 
process developed, a view that it was nested within the broader multilateral 
framework became firmly entrenched, reinforced for example through efforts to 
ensure that cooperation remained both WTO and UN consistent. This process 
was strengthened at the second Summit in 1998 which followed the onset of 
the Asian financial crisis. The product was a Statement on the Financial and 
Economic Situation in Asia (ASEM, 1998) which addressed the roles of the 
WTO, IMF and the World Bank in dealing with the crisis, and recognised the 
rules, norms and values of these institutions as underpinning the fabric of the 
global economy. The premising of ASEM cooperation on these multilateral rules 
helped to cement participants into the architecture of global governance, drawing 
in states such as China which had not previously been a part of that system, 
and providing an important training ground for engagement in multilateral 
diplomacy (Commission official, cited in Doidge, 2011, p. 140). In this respect, 
ASEM served both as a means for familiarising China with the expectations 
associated with involvement in WTO-led economic multilateralism, while at 
the same time effectively testing the resolve of Chinese leaders to participate. 
Indeed, so central to the economic pillar of ASEM was this socialisation function 
and drive to achieve Chinese (and Vietnamese) membership in the World Trade 
Organization that in the aftermath of their WTO accession this pillar of the 
dialogue was seen to have somewhat lost its way (Commission official, cited in 
Doidge, 2011, p. 140).
4 The Chinese application in 1986 was classed in terms of a “resumption of place”. The 
Republic of China had been a founding member of the GATT (General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs) in 1948 but had withdrawn two years later as the Republic of 
China (Taiwan). The People’s Republic of China therefore made the claim that the 
ROC’s withdrawal was not legitimate as it had not been an expression of the will of 
the majority of Chinese.
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6. aSEM re-evaluated
These two examples of success share the underlying fact of dialogue and 
engagement. They are essentially discursive processes directed towards the 
building of identities and reaching common understanding, and the acceptance 
of core norms and practices, rather than toward the achievement of substantive 
outcomes. As noted previously, it is in these elements that the value of ASEM 
over its first two decades came increasingly to be seen to reside. As an informal 
process, ASEM is identified as an important arena for conducting dialogue on a 
range of issues without preconceptions and without any expectation that partners 
will be bound by discussions, thus increasing the willingness of those involved 
to address potentially contentious issues in an open fashion. In this respect, 
it serves as a useful mechanism for generating an understanding of positions 
and perspectives among a diverse array of states on issues of consequence, 
facilitating problem-solving and contributing to efforts at the global level. 
As such, the forum has proved beneficial in addressing issues, sometimes of 
a sensitive nature, which are not considered elsewhere—the Myanmar issue, 
for example. Further, given the breadth of ASEM’s sub-Summit engagement, 
particular value has been found in the facility to organise specific meetings 
and working groups under the ASEM umbrella which may involve small or 
large sections of the broader membership and incorporate non-governmental 
and civil society actors, occur in single or multiple iterations, and involve simple 
information sharing or be seen as the foundation for greater cooperation on issues 
of specific sectoral interest, be this on sanitary and phytosanitary standards, 
customs and border control, quality assurance in higher education, child welfare 
or whatever the case may be. Finally, the density of ongoing interaction at all 
levels means that ASEM provides a context in which to establish direct personal 
contacts with a variety of partners, contributing to the building of trust and 
mutual understanding, the forging of shared identities, and, as a consequence, 
strengthening the foundations of regional stability and security.
This change in the way in which ASEM is conceived and valued has become 
widespread and can be seen in the forum’s continuing expansion. From an initial 
membership of 26 (25 states plus the European Commission) to the current 
53 (51 states plus the European Commission and the ASEAN Secretariat), this 
enlargement has continued despite the lack of concrete outcomes. Indeed, these 
newer member states, acceding in the period since the establishment of the 
Asia–Europe Meeting, were arguably possessed of a clearer understanding as to 
what the forum involves and can deliver than were its founders. That such states 
have entered with eyes wide open may be seen in the example of New Zealand.
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While initially New Zealand’s interest in ASEM centred on the anticipation of 
substantive outcomes around trade liberalisation, by the time of its entry in 2010 
this had been replaced by a view of the utility of the process in other areas. For 
New Zealand, ASEM serves two core functions: (i) as an arena for dialogue 
and access; and (ii) as a tool for reinforcing presence and identity. ASEM’s role 
in facilitating dialogue and generating understanding is emphasised within the 
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), with awareness 
building around issues of regional significance seen as potentially the raison 
d’être of the forum (senior MFAT official, cited in Doidge, 2013, p. 155). Of 
particular significance has been the role of the Asia–Europe Foundation, the 
Governors’ Meetings of which have generated dialogue on a range of topics 
in a manner not replicated elsewhere. Beyond this general process, however, 
the Asia–Europe Meeting is seen to offer specific benefit in facilitating access 
to Asian and European leaders and officials, with the opportunity to engage 
in bilateral or mini-lateral dialogue in the margins of the various ASEM fora. 
While this most obviously involves accessing larger powers, it also means 
engaging with smaller and more peripheral states (insofar as New Zealand is 
concerned) with which, due to limited foreign policy resources, relations may 
be only intermittent at best. In this is to be found, from the MFAT perspective, 
potentially the single greatest benefit of ASEM involvement (senior MFAT 
official, cited in Doidge, 2013, pp. 155–156).
Beyond such opportunities for dialogue and access, ASEM is also seen as a 
mechanism for reinforcing New Zealand’s presence in the Asian region, a 
central goal of its foreign policy. Alongside participation in the EAS, APEC 
and the various ASEAN fora, the Asia–Europe Meeting is seen to provide an 
additional means for demonstrating New Zealand’s Asian credentials, and to 
cement it more firmly into the Asian regional architecture (senior MFAT official, 
in Doidge, 2013, p. 156). In other words, the progressive layering of fora 
(including ASEM) within which New Zealand participates is part of a process of 
identity building, involving the assertion of a place as part of the Asian caucus, 
even if it is not necessarily an Asian state.
7. conclusion
What seems clear then, is that, over the two decades since its inception at the 
Bangkok Summit in 1996, the role of the Asia–Europe Meeting—including, 
importantly, participant expectations around the forum—has evolved 
Bereitgestellt von  University of Canterbury | Heruntergeladen  10.11.19 21:25   UTC
17
ASEM’s First Two Decades: A Role Discovered
Baltic Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 9, No. 2 (27)
considerably. At the most basic level, this transition is a product of the place 
of ASEM as the first iteration of transregionalism, and therefore the lack of 
a pre-existing model on which to base initial expectations. The accrual of 
experience over the succeeding two decades therefore played an important 
part in defining the role and functioning of such structures. While anticipated 
substantive outcomes—particularly around trade liberalisation—have so 
far failed to eventuate, and indeed seem beyond the capacity of the forum to 
achieve, participants have increasingly come to recognise what the forum does 
do well. In this respect, ideational aspects such as identity building and norm 
diffusion, and the value of dialogue without preconceptions, have come to 
the fore, a product of the breadth and informal nature of engagement. What 
seems to be the case is that after twenty years of interaction the Asia–Europe 
Meeting has come somewhat into its own, carving out a role for itself in the 
increasingly densely institutionalised architecture of global governance. What 
remains to be seen is whether this vision of ASEM is unique to the Asia–Europe 
structure, or one that will come to characterise transregionalism more generally. 
In 1999, for example, the Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation was 
launched. FEALAC was explicitly modelled on ASEM, both in its three-pillared 
institutional structure and in its modalities of cooperation, and showed a certain 
synergy of expectations around engagement, though interaction has been more 
limited and at a slower pace. Whether it undergoes a parallel transformation 
to its Asia–Europe counterpart, recognising similar value in the ideational and 
discursive components of interaction will provide a significant indicator as to 
the future of transregionalism.
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